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Automated classification of primary care patient safety incident report 
content and severity using supervised Machine Learning (ML) 
approaches 
 
Introduction 
Learning from patient safety incident reports is a vital part of improving 
healthcare. However, the volume of reports and their largely free-text nature 
poses a major analytic challenge.  
  
Objectives 
Test the capability of autonomous classifying of free text within patient safety 
incident reports to determine incident type and the severity of harm outcome.  
  
Materials and Methods 
Primary care patient safety incident reports (n=31333) previously expert-
categorised by clinicians (training data) were processed using J48, SVM and 
Naïve Bayes. 
  
Results 
The SVM classifier was the highest scoring classifier for incident type 
(AUROC, 0.891) and severity of harm (AUROC, 0.708). Incident reports 
containing deaths were most easily classified, correctly identifying 72.82% of 
reports. 
  
Conclusions 
Supervised ML can be used to classify patient safety incident report 
categories. The severity classifier, whilst not accurate enough to replace 
manual processing, could provide a valuable screening tool for this critical 
aspect of patient safety. 
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Background and Significance 
 
Harm associated with healthcare is the third leading cause of death in the 
United States 1. It affects over 10% of patients in hospital 2,3 and 2-3% of 
those seen in primary care settings 4. A patient safety incident is said to occur 
when a situation that could have resulted, or did result, in avoidable harm to a 
patient is observed during healthcare delivery 5. Many of these incidents can 
involve life and death moments. It should be beyond debate that health 
systems extract the maximum value from analyses to prevent similar 
occurrences in the future. 
 
Healthcare has a poor record of creating actionable learning for quality 
improvement from patient safety incident reports 6. One important reason for 
this is that the most important information – the elements that throws light on 
causation – is described in the free-text part of an incident report. Whilst every 
incident report is read and actioned locally, it is often not until they are 
aggregated that patterns become apparent. In order to aggregate this data 
though, it must be categorised in the same manner and to the same standard. 
Unless read and pre-categorised, this information cannot be aggregated to 
establish frequency and nature of factors that may have contributed to the 
harm or potential harm to patients. A traditional approach of establishing a 
classification framework, creating categories and rules for applying them, and 
then training coding clerks is invariably defeated by the logistics. For example, 
in England and Wales over 100,000 patient safety incident reports are 
submitted by frontline clinical staff every month 7. On a national level, only a 
Submission to Health Informatics Journal 
3 
 
small proportion of the approximately one million patient safety incidents a 
year is ever analysed for causation 8,9. This is a remarkable and troubling 
failure to use data that have already been collected in order to protect patients 
from harm and inform health system improvements. Rather than focusing 
decisions on which small minority of incidents to prioritise for analysis 10, a 
potential solution to the large-scale data loss is Natural Language Processing 
(NLP) used in conjunction with machine learning (ML).  Together, they can 
convert unstructured free text into structured information autonomously 11-15. 
Automatically and accurately assigning incident categories to incident reports 
would remove a major manual component of our current patient safety 
strategy on a national level..  These computing methods were a key priority 
for future research into patient safety incident reporting systems in a recent 
government-funded evaluation 16.   
 
A pre-determinant of success of a supervised NLP implementation is the 
availability of large quantities of suitable training data from which the machine 
can learn 11, and which have been categorised by a domain expert 13. The 
recent PISA study 16 provided a unique corpus of primary care patient safety 
incident reports that had been read, categorised and coded by trained 
clinicians with expertise in patient safety and human factors.  
 
 
Aim 
This study aimed to test the capability of NLP/ML to classify unstructured free 
text within patient safety incident reports in two main themes: the incident 
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category and harm severity.  Each incident had been previously classified 
manually by an expert clinical and human factors team applying a 
classification framework that had been developed and validated by the 
research group 16. For each of these, the study sought to examine whether 
this could be achieved using just the unstructured free text description of an 
incident report alone, or whether the addition of structured categorical data 
(routinely collected as part of incident reports, such as specialty) improved the 
success of the autonomous classification. 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
 
(a) Classifiers 
This study tested supervised machine learning classifiers, which use pre-
existing categorised data to derive learning 17. Machine learning classifiers 
and techniques which are able to classify text in documents, including within 
patient safety incident reports, were identified through literature review.  For 
each research question, three different machine learning classifiers were 
trained and subsequently evaluated – Naïve Bayes, J48 and Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) with a polykernel. J48, Naïve Bayes and SVM were chosen 
since they have been successful in classifying medical incident reports in 
previous studies 18,19, and represent two distinct approaches to supervised 
machine learning, namely generative and discriminative models 20: 
 
 Naïve Bayes, a traditional generative classifier, has repeatedly 
demonstrated success in document classification tasks 15.  
 J48’s decision tree structure provides an output that can be intuitively 
checked by domain experts with limited ML/NLP experience, allowing 
validation of the core logic of the tree 21. 
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 SVMs are discriminative classifiers which can cope well with training 
data consisting of large numbers of irrelevant features, as is the case 
with our text data. For this reason they have consistently outperformed 
other classifiers in a number of text categorisation tasks.  They are also 
less prone to class imbalance problems 22.  
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(bc) Data sources  
Patient safety incident reports are principally a free text description 23 with 
additional categorical values such as location and time to add context. As part 
of the PISA study the incidents have been categorised against a framework 
which was iteratively developed, validated and is described in detail 
elsewhere (the PISA framework) 7. A pre-determinant of success of a 
supervised NLP implementation is the availability of large quantities of 
suitable training data from which the machine can learn 11, and which have 
been categorised by a domain expert 13. Patient safety incident reports have 
been aggregated nationally in England and Wales since 2003 7. Cardiff 
University holds a complete anonymised copy of this for research purposes. 
Approximately 50,000 incident reports have been read, categorised and 
coded by trained clinicians with expertise in patient safety and human factors 
at Cardiff University. The incidents have been categorised against a 
framework which was iteratively developed, validated and is described in 
detail elsewhere (the PISA framework) 7. Categories were applied using the 
Recursive Model of Incident Report Analysis which ensures a chronological 
listing of incidents culminating in the event that directly harmed the patient 7. 
This leads to several levels of incident type – “primary” denoting the incident 
directly impacting the patient, then subsequent levels show the chain of 
factors that may have contributed to the incident. The PISA study 16 also 
examined the originally submitted incident reports and reclassified the severity 
rating. This was used in the present study. 
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Subset 
Incidents that had been categorised as part of the PISA study and related 
studies were extracted from the database at Cardiff University. Those that had 
not been categorised by the main PISA incident and severity framework were 
removed, leaving 31333 incident reports. There were 16 categorical columns 
variables and four free-text columns variables of data extracted for all incident 
reports (see appendix 2). One free-text category was rarely completed and 
often with similar material, and therefore was treated as categorical. The data 
were then split into two subsets – one including just the free text “description 
of what happened” field, and another that included all the columns of data 
available to allow evaluation of whether the additional columns of categorical 
data assisted the classifier or not. The data were then converted into the 
Attribute Relation File Format (ARFF) ready for importing into the machine 
learning software, as per previous studies in the area 19,24.  
 
Dataset processing – characteristics 
Figure 1 shows the class imbalance inherent at a high level, with 
12649/31333 (40.4%) incidents in the “0 - Incorrect use of system” category”, 
compared to only 501 (1.6%) in the “10 – Other” category. Therefore, the “0 - 
Incorrect use of system” category” and “6 – Medications” categories were 
expanded to their second level categories to reduce the class imbalance. 
Figure 2 shows the incident categories after the expansion.  
 
Figure 3 shows the incident severity categories. There were 19323 (61.7%) 
incidents that did not contain a severity category since they involved 
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categories that were excluded from severity assessment during the PISA 
study (e.g. “No harm from primary care” or “defensive reporting”).  
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Figure 1 - Number of incident reports by highest level incident categories (0-10) 
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Figure 2 -  Number- Number of incident reports by expanded incident categories (0.1 – 10) 
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Figure 3: Number of incident reports by severity 
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(cd) Software 
Data were accessed and extracted through Microsoft SQL Server 2014, 
hosted on a secure Microsoft Windows Server 2012R2 instance at Cardiff 
University. Data were subsequently imported into the Waikato Environment 
for Knowledge Analysis (Weka) 3.8.0, an NLP and ML environment 25. Weka 
is regularly used in healthcare document classification and has been used in 
previous studies into incident report classification 18,19. 
 
(de) Pre-processing incident reports 
 All free-text variables were firstly processed using the Weka’s 
StringToText filter in order to create a uniform representation for the 
reports. The following procedures were applied:  NGram Tokenisation 
to produce trigrams, bigrams and unigrams 13. Unigrams represent 
individual terms (e.g. “patient”, “wound”, etc). Bigrams and trigrams are 
sequences of two or three terms (e.g. blood form, blood group, blood 
result, blood request, pressure ulcer), which were utilised to add an 
element of semantic processing as negation could also be added (e.g. 
not allergic), which is important for producing correct classifier rules. 
 Lower case normalisation was used to ensure that all forms of the 
same word were classified together (e.g. Patient, patient, pAtient etc.) 
26 
-  “Stopword” filtering was used to exclude common words (such as 
he, she, it, why, we etc) which hold no classification value 13. This 
technique is commonly used in Information Retrieval and NLP 
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document classification implementations 26. The “Rainbow” stopwords 
list built into Weka was used 27 
 Term frequency filtering: previous studies have excluded words that 
appear infrequently in the corpus 17 and due to the large size of the 
corpus it was decided a minimum term frequency of 10 should be used. 
 Number of words in training set - 3000 words were kept as a 
balance between accuracy and resource (CPU/Memory) use. Once the 
features to be represented were defined through the above 
procedures, uniform vectorial representations of each report were 
created where each feature was assigned a TFxIDF (Term Frequency, 
Inverse Document Frequency) score for that report. TFxIDF values are 
a function of the frequency of the term in the report, weighted 
according to the frequency of occurrence of the term in the data set. 
Intuitively, these scores encode the intuition that the more often a term 
appears in a report, the more representative of that report it is, while 
the more reports it occurs in the less discriminative it is. TFxIDF scores 
can highlight relevant words when categorising large numbers of text 
documents 26,28,29. In order for the TF to be accurate, all documents 
were normalised so longer incident reports did not skew the results 30. 
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(e) Data Security 
All data were stored and accessed on a designated patient safety research 
computing cluster at Cardiff University, which has been designed with full 
NHS Information Governance Toolkit assurance for secondary use of data (IG 
Toolkit ID: 8WG65-PISA-CAG-0182). All data were stored and accessed in 
accordance with a data sharing agreement between NHS England and Cardiff 
University.  
 
All data was anonymised by NHS England, compliant with the highest 
standards of information governance regulations, before being received by 
Cardiff University. There is no way for researchers to re-identify patients or 
healthcare organisations.  
 
(g) Training and testing the individual classifiers 
Each classifier (e.g. SVM, NB) was trained and evaluated using a stratified 
ten-fold cross validation technique built into Weka, ensuring the maximum 
amount of training material was available for the training whilst also ensuring 
rigour and reproducibility 15,19.  
 
(h) Statistics and analyses 
Some types of incident reports are naturally reported more frequently (such as 
those related to medications and vaccines 16) leading to a “class imbalance”. 
Due to this, success measures were required that were not susceptible to 
class imbalance. Therefore, The Area Under the Receiver Operating Curve 
(AUROC) was chosen as our primary outcome measure since it provides a 
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single global measure of performance even in imbalanced data 31. Previous 
studies in ML/NLP have shown an AUROC of approximately >0.8 as being 
satisfactory, and the closer to 1.0 the better 32,33. However, to allow 
comparability with previous NLP and ML studies in this field, percentage 
correct and incorrect, precision, recall and F-measure are also reported. 
Weighted average values, as natively produced by Weka are reported.  
 
(i) Ethical research considerations 
The training data used for this current study were generated as part of the 
NIHR HS&DR study – “Characterising the nature of primary care patient 
safety incident reports in England and Wales: mixed methods study” - the 
PISA study, which analysed patient safety incident reports submitted to the 
National Reporting and Learning System from primary care in England and 
Wales between 2005 and 2013 7. The PISA study did not require Health 
Research Authority's REC approval and the Aneurin Bevan University Health 
Board research risk review committee waived the need for ethical approval 
(ABHB R&D Ref number: SA/410/13). Ethical approval for the current study 
was granted by the Swansea University REC (REF: 040816). 
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Results 
(A) Incident type classification – highest level incident categories (0-10) 
Table 1 shows the results of the ML categorisation for the highest level 
incident categories. SVM had the highest AUROC, improving from 0.839 to 
0.854 with the additional columns of data available (see appendix 2). 
 
Classifier Correct 
(%) 
Incorrect 
(%) 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
 
Precision 
 
Recall 
 
F-
Measure 
AUROC 
With all columns variables of data available 
SVM 64.111 35.889 0.523 0.629 0.641 0.633 0.854 
J48 58.437 41.563 0.4227 0.542 0.584 0.550 0.736 
NB 16.092 83.908 0.106 0.540 0.161 0.168 0.564 
With only “Description of Incident” available 
SVM 61.845 38.155 0.490 0.602 0.618 0.607 0.839 
J48 56.643 43.357 0.421 0.539 0.566 0.550 0.717 
NB 12.22 87.780 0.074 0.512 0.122 0.112 0.544 
 
Table 1 - Results of incident type categorisation for the highest-level incident categories 
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(B) Incident type classification – expanded incident categories (0.1-10) 
Table 2 shows the results of the ML categorisation for the expanded incident 
categories. SVM consistently had the highest AUROC and was improved by 
the addition of the additional columns of data from 0.870 to 0.891. Neither J48 
classifiers completed, aborting after 15 hours (see discussion).  
 
Classifier Correct 
(%) 
Incorrect 
(%) 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
 
Precision 
 
Recall 
 
F-
Measure 
AUROC 
With all columns variables of data available 
SVM 52.558 47.442 0.493 0.515 0.526 0.516 0.891 
J48 Did not complete 
NB 4.270 95.730 0.037 0.318 0.043 0.061 0.520 
With only “Description of Incident” available 
SVM 46.855 53.145 0.4313 0.462 0.469 0.462 0.870 
J48 Did not complete 
NB 3.20 96.799 0.0277 0.302 0.032 0.045 0.515 
 
Table 2 - Results of incident type categorisation for the expanded incident categories 
 
 
Table 3 shows the AUROC for each individual incident category, when using 
the SVM classifier and all columns variables of data. It has been coloured as 
a heat map. Classes that achieved AUROC >0.98 included 0.4, 0.6, 0.7, 0.9 
and 6.11. Seventeen of the 18 medication categories achieved an AUROC of 
>0.8.  
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Table 3 also shows that the number of incident reports in a category is not 
necessarily proportional to AUROC. For example, category 6.3 has 2686 
incidents, AUROC 0.977, but category 6.14 has only 40 incidents but an 
AUROC of 0.973. In addition, some categories had high numbers of incident 
reports but low AUROC such as category 0.3, which had 3392 incident 
reports but an AUROC of only 0.791. 
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Class AUROC 
Number of 
incidents 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
0 – Incorrect use of system 0.851 157 0.291 0.102 0.151 
0.1 – Defensive Reporting 0.773 357 0.313 0.084 0.132 
0.2 – Irrelevant 0.726 2991 0.302 0.280 0.290 
0.3 – Insufficient detail 0.791 3392 0.460 0.479 0.469 
0.4 – Reporting deaths 0.983 422 0.616 0.737 0.671 
0.5 – Incident not related to healthcare 0.929 2015 0.608 0.594 0.601 
0.6 – Pressure ulcer 0.981 2398 0.757 0.786 0.772 
0.7 – Healthcare associated infection 0.993 64 0.593 0.547 0.569 
0.8 – Complaints/Coroner investigation 0.857 129 0.318 0.109 0.162 
0.9 – Appropriate breach of confidentiality 0.990 724 0.782 0.822 0.801 
1 – Administration 0.884 2734 0.432 0.533 0.477 
2 – Documentation 0.932 855 0.537 0.483 0.509 
3 – Referral 0.878 1532 0.356 0.337 0.346 
4 – Diagnosis and Assessment 0.895 1553 0.387 0.458 0.420 
5 – Treatment and procedures 0.866 1876 0.399 0.418 0.408 
6 – Medications and vaccines 0.807 58 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.1 - Clinical Treatment Decision Errors in the 
treatment decision-making process  
0.806 238 0.291 0.067 0.109 
6.2 – Wrong Medication prescribed 0.948 1243 0.541 0.648 0.590 
6.3 – Dispensing medication orders error 0.977 2686 0.785 0.842 0.812 
6.4 – Administering medication errors  0.931 819 0.504 0.591 0.544 
6.5 – Monitoring medications 0.944 152 0.478 0.283 0.355 
6.6 – Adverse event (inc allergies) 0.945 321 0.533 0.505 0.518 
6.7 – Drug omission 0.902 54 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.8 – Patient self-administered overdose 0.911 81 0.333 0.086 0.137 
6.9 – Incorrect storage 0.967 44 0.400 0.091 0.148 
6.10 – Medication Timeliness  0.916 476 0.432 0.408 0.419 
6.11 – Vaccines 0.988 534 0.806 0.801 0.804 
6.12 – Medication unavailable 0.887 61 0.600 0.148 0.237 
6.13 – Prescription handling  0.969 74 0.444 0.162 0.238 
6.14 – Lost medication 0.973 40 0.450 0.225 0.300 
6.15 - Inappropriate medication supply 0.911 14 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.16 - Unsuitable medication taken by patient 0.806 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.17 – OTC medication 0.500 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7 – Investigations 0.977 1473 0.776 0.777 0.776 
8 – Communication 0.840 510 0.198 0.159 0.176 
9 – Equipment 0.899 751 0.461 0.379 0.416 
10 - Other 0.870 501 0.342 0.188 0.242 
Table 3  - AUROC for Expanded incident categories, with all columns of data 
available using the SVM classifier   
Formatted Table
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(C) Severity classification 
Table 4 shows the results for severity classification. SVM achieved the 
highest AUROC at 0.708 with all columns of data, although this was not 
above our threshold for accuracy for clinical use. Figure 4 shows the 
confusion matrix for the SVM classifier for the expanded incident categories 
and has been coloured to demonstrate where the classifier has classified 
correctly and where it has failed. In the death category it correctly identified 
72.85% (225/309) of cases involving death compared to only 20.95% in the 
severe harm category.  
 
 
Classifier Correct 
(%) 
Incorrect 
(%) 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
 
Precision 
 
Recall 
 
F-
Measure 
AUROC 
With all columns variables of data available 
SVM 64.371 35.627 0.448 0.643 0.644 0.643 0.708 
J48 64.355 35.645 0.420 0.644 0.644 0.629 0.694 
NB 20.900 79.001 0.113 0.589 0.209 0.276 0.573 
With only “Description of Incident” available 
SVM 61.091 38.909 0.392 0.609 0.611 0.609 0.683 
J48 58.943 41.058 0.359 0.585 0.589 0.587 0.647 
NB 16.728 83.272 0.088 0.595 0.167 0.226 0.561 
 
Table 4 -Results of severity categorisation for the expanded incident 
categories 
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Figure 4 - Confusion matrix for severity classification for SVM with all columns 
of data available (green = perfect correct classification, yellow = close to 
perfect orange and red = classification failures)
 
 Classified by NLP/ML Classifier  
 
Classified 
as  
1  
(No 
Harm) 
2  
(low 
Harm) 
3 
(Moderate) 
4 
(Severe) 
5  
(Death) 
% 
Correct 
Classified 
by humans 
1  
(No Harm) 
2028 1183 87 1 3 61.42 
2  
(Low 
Harm) 
1285 3957 563 15 15 67.81 
3 
(Moderate) 
167 628 1477 57 25 62.74 
4  
(Severe) 
14 51 88 44 13 20.95 
5  
(Death) 
7 31 33 13 225 72.82 
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Discussion 
 
This study has shown great promise for automatically analysing patient safety 
incidents, and has achieved this in several incident categories. It has 
succeeded in accurately identifying classifying the content of incident reports 
particularly in medication incidents (17/18 categories achieving an AUROC of 
>0.8) and in pressure ulcers (AUROC 0.981). We have also succeeded in 
identifying patients who have died, from the content of incident reports, 
correctly 72.82% of the time which will provide a valuable safety net for 
national analyses.  
 
However, we have also shown that this method does not perform well when 
classifying the severity of harm of patient safety incident reports. Whilst the 
so-called “bag of words” approach yields limited success, this may be 
sufficient to serve as a safety net to ensure that important cases are not 
missed during review. This study has also highlighted the categories that 
need both further refining of their definitions, and where additional categorised 
incident reports are needed to most efficiently improve and refine the 
classifier. For example, vaccine errors achieved an almost perfect AUROC of 
0.988 – thus further human classification would not improve this value 
considerably. In contrast, further training material for the category “8 – 
Communication” (with an AUROC of 0.84 and only 510 reports) may improve 
its accuracy considerably.  
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We found that the number of incident reports is not proportional to the overall 
success of the categorisation. This is consistent with Ong et al. (2010). 
Potentially, once the classifier has ascertained the best words to identify an 
incident category, further reports do not add to its accuracy.  
 
Certain categories were harder to classify autonomously than others.  This is 
also true of incidents studied in the aviation industry 34. This may be because 
certain categories have few specific terms that the algorithm can utilise to 
confidently discriminate. Conversely, certain categories which have very 
specific words, such as in pressure ulcers (category 0.6), where words such 
as “pressure” and “grade” are fairly unique in medicine to this topic lead to 
highly accurate classifications. This has been highlighted in previous work 32. 
Similarly, since healthcare professionals write reports in very high level, 
technical language it regularly contains abbreviations and acronyms which 
pose a further problem for the classifier 35,36. More problematic for certain 
categories, such as “7 investigations”, where healthcare professionals are 
more likely to call a “Full Blood Count” an “FBC”, or a “Positron Emission 
Tomography scan” a “PET scan” than in other domains like communication. 
However, this can also be seen as a positive since terms that are specific to  
certain domains are ideal for a classifier. Nuances and ambiguity of language 
can lead to confusion for the classifier and this has been highlighted as a 
problem in other NLP/ML applications too 11. The addition of spelling mistakes 
causes further issues for the classifier since it treats different spellings as 
different words and thus classifies them differently. This is regularly a problem 
in other NLP/ML studies 35.  
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However, although the number of words may not influence accuracy, when 
combined with our hardest task (computationally) – the expanded incident 
categories with 37 possible categories - it may explain why the J48 classifier 
failed. Decision trees are computationally expensive, needing large amounts 
of resource (processing and memory) and do not scale to large numbers of 
classes 37. In this study, that led to the J48 classifier running out of memory 
before completing. 
 
One key category which posed problems for the classifier is contained in the 
0.2 category, 0.2.1 – no harm from primary care. This category is used where 
there is a patient safety incident but it was not caused by an act or omission 
by primary care. It is likely that the classifier correctly identifies these incidents 
as, for example, medication incidents but because it was caused by 
secondary care it is classified as “no harm from primary care” by the PISA 
study. It is therefore seen as a misclassification, despite the classifier being 
technically correct. 
 
 
Strengths and Limitations 
This study had several strengths. Firstly, it was the first study of its kind to use 
UK primary care data incident reports and moreover, was the largest ML/NLP 
study of patient safety incident reports conducted that we are aware of. 
Secondly, it used more incident categories than any other study we are aware 
of, and it was the first of its kind to use not only the information from the 
reporter, but in addition, the expert applied PISA classification system 7.  
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There are several broad limiting factors for the overall performance of the 
study however, often these were out of our (and any studies) control namely 
the original content of the incident reports, the PISA coding of the incident 
reports (and their sampling) and inherent limitations of the classifiers 
themselves. 
 
As seen in other studies on incident analysis, clear definitions can be more 
important than the size of the training set from which the classifier has to learn  
34. Table 4 shows this clearly and here this study’s methodology may have 
limited the outcome of its classifier. The PISA classification was iteratively 
developed and contains over 350 different incident categories. It was decided 
at the outset that there were insufficient data to train a classifier on all 350 
categories, due to its hierarchical structure, and therefore to focus on the 
highest level categories (0 to 10). Whilst this seems at the outset to be simpler 
for the classifier, it may conversely lead to more confusion since large 
quantities of incident reports are now grouped by broad vague concepts such 
as “Medication incidents”, “Incorrect use of system” and “Other”. The 
“Incorrect use of system” category is the broadest, ranging from pressure 
ulcers, through to defensive reporting. To assess if this had caused further 
confusion the broadest categories - “Incorrect use of system” and “Medication 
incidents” – were broken down to their next level in the hierarchy which 
increased the AUROC despite increasing the number of categories from 11 to 
31 and at the same time reducing the number of categories available in each 
category from which to train. 
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The classifiers used in this study were trained only on the final incident that 
has directly led to patient harm. However, a single report may contain several 
interconnected incidents that led to the final outcome. The classifier may 
correctly identify any number of incidents contained within the report, but if it 
does not choose the final/primary incident it will technically get the category 
wrong. This will require further research. The ultimate category applied to an 
incident is often subject to much debate and scrutiny, often requiring a third 
party to cast the final vote 7. This is seen in numerous studies which used 
expert-categorised data to train their classifiers, where disagreement between 
experts was seen in up to 20% of cases 38. Therefore, we should not expect 
every incident to have been categorised in exactly the same way due to there 
being several (albeit highly trained) coders in the original study 16. 
 
The “bag of words” strategy, is a simple and effective approach; however, 
structure from the text is lost and thus the semantic meaning 12,18. Negation is 
lost (e.g. “no allergies”) which poses a major problem since it treats the word 
‘allergies’ the same irrespective of the preceding terms and this has been 
shown to be a problem in other studies 39. To compensate for this, bigrams 
and trigrams were utilised in this study which would have attempted to identify 
the above example. Another solution is to use a semantic processor which 
can analyse sentences in their entirety 13. However, even with this approach, 
sometimes the sentences either side can affect the meaning of the sentence 
in question, so called ‘cross-sentence correlation’, which can have a similar 
effect as negation 40. Recent works with paragraph vectors have shown 
improvements on the bag of words model by up to 30% 41.  
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Comparison with previous work 
 
There has been little research conducted on the use of ML and NLP in 
automating incident report analysis in healthcare 18. There has been 
considerably more research and success with it in incident reports in aviation 
34, and notable successes reported for text classification from verbal 
autopsies42 which have several similarities with incident reports. Of those 
studies of safety reports inin healthcare, Wong et al. (2013) undertook a study 
of 227 Canadian medication incident reports, and used a custom classifier 
based on logistic regression to achieve good accuracy in autonomously 
categorising incident type 32. Ong et al. (2010) performed a larger study of 
972 incident reports in Australia by focusing on two types of patient safety 
incident: “inadequate clinical handover” and “incorrect patient identification”. 
They used Naïve Bayes (NB) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier 
with excellent results (accuracy up to 97.98% with SVM on patient 
identification incidents) but noted that the topics chosen had very specific 
words that the classifier could easily detect which probably lead to their good 
results 18. Gupta and Patrick (2013) undertook a larger study of 5448 
Australian incident reports, including 13 categories of incident type and 
utilised NB, SVM as well as the J48 decision tree classifier. They have 
reported achieving good results in an online presentation, however their 
detailed methodology has not been published making further comparison 
difficult. 19. The largest work in the field (up until now) appears to have been 
undertaken in Japan, where 15,000 patient safety incident reports were 
Commented [MOU6]: Danso et al., 2014.  
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clustered using cluster analysis to ascertain their incident type but they did not 
provide statistical or numerical results 23,43. A recent paper by Wang and 
colleagues looked at using ML and NLP to categorise Australian incident 
reports 44. Their study used fewer incident categories and used a significantly 
smaller dataset than ours and they too struggled to classify severity level. 
Wang et al also demonstrated the difference that using balanced datasets 
makes to the accuracy of the task, although since real world incident report 
data are inherently imbalanced we did not choose to balance our dataset.  
 
 
Recommendations for future work 
 
This project is the largest attempt at classifying patient safety incident reports 
in primary care to date, but further research will be required to achieve the 
same results on secondary care data. Within the scope of the current dataset 
future research could focus on examining incident reports in their entirety 
utilising semantic classifiers12, and whether sequences of incidents can be 
extracted, something that has been researched in airline incident report 
analysis29. Although the categorical data routinely collected with each report is 
often non-specific, as it improved our study’s performance it would be prudent 
to further research how these data can be used to enhance incident report 
categorisation. Further work around J48, either using reduced categories or 
superior infrastructure is required, since its “human readable” output allows 
checking for plausibility by patient safety experts. Improving definitions and 
increased training examples of select categories will likely further improve the 
performance. 
Further research should focus on looking at the incident report as a whole and 
utilise semantic classifiers12. In addition, further research should explore 
whether it is possible to classify the incident sequence within each report, 
which has also been identified in airline incident report analysis 29. Finally, and 
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fundamentally, improving the definitions of certain incident categories, 
coupled with additional examples of incident reports in some categories, is 
probably the next key step towards fully autonomous classification of incident 
reports in primary care in NHS England and Wales. 
 
This project is the largest attempt at classifying patient safety incident reports 
in primary care to date. However, its focus on primary care may limit its 
generalisability on other patient safety datasets such as secondary care and 
further research should focus on ML/NLP in secondary care in the UK.  
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Conclusion 
 
Converting unstructured data to structured data using NLP/ML is challenging 
across all subject domains 13,40,45. However, the highly nuanced and technical 
nature of medical text adds a further dimension of complexity 46. Whilst this 
study shows that NLP/ML is not perfect and cannot yet replace manual review 
entirely 47, it suggests that it can act as a safety net, identifying cases that 
lead to severe harm and death, that have been incorrectly classified. The 
ability to determine certain categories accurately can also assist reviewers in 
those areas to focus on cases that need manual review – saving money and 
time 48. It also opens up the possibility of clustering reports that are “near 
misses” or “no harm”, which are currently too time consuming to work on in 
healthcare; which is a key strategy used by the airline industry in their 
successful safety model 49.  
 
  
Submission to Health Informatics Journal 
32 
 
References 
 
1. Makary MA, Daniel M. Medical error—the third leading cause of 
death in the US. BMJ; i2139–5. 
2. Vincent C, Neale G, Woloshynowych M. Adverse events in British 
hospitals: preliminary retrospective record review. BMJ 2001. 
3. Rafter N, Hickey A, Condell S, et al. Adverse events in healthcare: 
learning from mistakes. QJM; 108: 273–277. 
4. Panesar SS, deSilva D, Carson-Stevens A, et al. How safe is 
primary care? A systematic review. BMJ Quality & Safety; 25: 
544–553. 
5. World Health Organization. Conceptual Framework for the 
International Classification for Patient Safety. 1–153. 
6. Stavropoulou C, Doherty C, Tosey P. How Effective Are Incident-
Reporting Systems for Improving Patient Safety? A Systematic 
Literature Review. Milbank Q; 93: 826–866. 
7. Carson-Stevens A, Hibbert P, Avery A, et al. A cross-sectional 
mixed methods study protocol to generate learning from patient 
safety incidents reported from general practice. BMJ Open; 5: 
e009079–8. 
8. National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). Seven Steps to patient 
safety: full reference guide. 
nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resourceshttp://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/
?entryid45=59787&q=0%c2%acseven+steps+to+patient+safety%c
2%ac (2004, accessed 15 June 2016). 
9. National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). Being open: 
communicating patient safety incidents with patients, their families 
and care. nrls.npsa.nhs.ukresourcescollectionsbeing-
openhttp://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/collections/being-
open/?entryid45=83726 (2009, accessed 1 August 2016). 
10. Hibbert PD, Healey F, Lamont T, et al. Patient safety's missing 
link: using clinical expertise to recognize, respond to and reduce 
risks at a population level. Int J Qual Health Care; 28: 114–121. 
11. Erhardt RA-A, Schneider R, Blaschke C. Status of text-mining 
techniques applied to biomedical text. Drug Discovery Today; 11: 
315–325. 
12. Hirschberg J, Manning CD. Advances in natural language 
processing. Science; 349: 261–266. 
Submission to Health Informatics Journal 
33 
 
13. Kimia AA, Savova G, Landschaft A, et al. An Introduction to 
Natural Language Processing How You Can Get More From 
Those Electronic Notes You Are Generating. Pediatr Emerg Care; 
31: 536–541. 
14. Melton GB, Hripcsak G. Automated Detection of Adverse Events 
Using Natural Language Processing of Discharge Summaries. J 
Am Med Inform Assoc; 12: 448–457. 
15. Witten IH, Frank E, Hall MA. Data Mining: Practical Machine 
Learning Tools and Techniques. 3rd ed. Morgan Kaufmann 
Publishers Inc., 2011. 
16. Carson-Stevens A, Hibbert P, Williams H, et al. Characterising the 
nature of primary care patient safety incident reports in the 
England and Wales National Reporting and Learning System: a 
mixed-methods agenda-setting study for general practice. Health 
Services and Delivery Research; 4: 1–76. 
17. Savova GK, Ogren PV, Duffy PH, et al. Mayo Clinic NLP System 
for Patient Smoking Status Identification. J Am Med Inform Assoc; 
15: 25–28. 
18. Ong M-S, Magrabi F, Coiera E. Automated categorisation of 
clinical incident reports using statistical text classification. Quality 
and Safety in Health Care; 19: e55–e55. 
19. Gupta J, Patrick J. Automated validation of patient safety clinical 
incident classification: macro analysis. Stud Health Technol 
Inform; 188: 52–57. 
20. Ng AY, Jordan MI. On discriminative vs. generative classifiers: A 
comparison of logistic regression and naive bayes. Advances in 
neural information processing systems; 841–848. 
21. Yadav K, Sarioglu E, Smith M, et al. Automated Outcome 
Classification of Emergency Department Computed Tomography 
Imaging Reports. Acad Emerg Med; 20: 848–854. 
22. Japkowicz N, Stephen S. The class imbalance problem: A 
systematic study. Intelligent data analysis; 429–449. 
23. Fujita K, Akiyama M, Toyama N, et al. Detecting effective classes 
of medical incident reports based on linguistic analysis for 
common reporting system in Japan. Stud Health Technol Inform; 
192: 137–141. 
24. Pollettini JT, Panico SRG, Daneluzzi JC, et al. Using Machine 
Learning Classifiers to Assist Healthcare-Related Decisions: 
Classification of Electronic Patient Records. J Med Syst; 36: 3861–
3874. 
Submission to Health Informatics Journal 
34 
 
25. Frank E, Hall MA, Witten IH. Waikato Environment for Knowledge 
Analysis (Weka). 2016. 
26. Alicante A, Amato F, Cozzolino G. A Study on Textual Features for 
Medical Records Classification. Studies in Health Technology and 
Informatics 2015. Epub ahead of print 2015. DOI: 10.3233/978-1-
61499-474-9-370. 
27. Kachites M. Bow: a Toolkit for Statistical Language Modeling, Text 
Retrieval, Classification and Clustering. 
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~mccallum/bow (1996). 
28. Alparslan E, Karahoca A, Bahşi H. Classification of confidential 
documents by using adaptive neurofuzzy inference systems. 
Procedia - Procedia Computer Science; 3: 1412–1417. 
29. Ittoo A, Le Minh Nguyen, van den Bosch A. Text analytics in 
industry: Challenges, desiderata and trends. Computers in 
Industry; 78: 96–107. 
30. Manning CD, Raghavan P, Schutze H. Introduction to Information 
Retrieval. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Epub 
ahead of print 2009. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511809071. 
31. Batista GE, Prati RC, Monard MC. A study of the behavior of 
several methods for balancing machine learning training data. 
ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter; 6: 20. 
32. Wong Z, Akiyama M. Statistical text classifier to detect specific 
type of medical incidents. MedInfo 2013. Epub ahead of print 
2013. DOI: 10.3233/978-1-61499-289-9-1053. 
33. Tenório JM, Hummel AD, Cohrs FM, et al. Artificial intelligence 
techniques applied to the development of a decision-support 
system for diagnosing celiac disease. Int J Med Inform; 80: 793–
802. 
34. Tanguy L, Tulechki N, Urieli A, et al. Natural language processing 
for aviation safety reports: From classification to interactive 
analysis. Computers in Industry; 78: 80–95. 
35. Penz JFE, Wilcox AB, Hurdle JF. Automated identification of 
adverse events related to central venous catheters. Journal of 
Biomedical Informatics; 40: 174–182. 
36. Savova GK, Fan J, Ye Z, et al. Discovering peripheral arterial 
disease cases from radiology notes using natural language 
processing. AMIA Annu Symp Proc; 2010: 722–726. 
Submission to Health Informatics Journal 
35 
 
37. Moise I, Pournaras E, Helbing D. Classification and Decision 
Treeshttps://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/computational-social-science-
dam/documents/education/Spring2016/Datascience/Classification
%20and%20Decision%20Trees.pdf (2016, accessed 7 December 
2016). 
38. Hripcsak G, Austin JHM, Alderson PO, et al. Use of Natural 
Language Processing to Translate Clinical Information from a 
Database of 889,921 Chest Radiographic Reports1. Radiology; 
224: 157–163. 
39. Hou JK, Chang M, Nguyen T, et al. Automated Identification of 
Surveillance Colonoscopy in Inflammatory Bowel Disease Using 
Natural Language Processing. Dig Dis Sci; 58: 936–941. 
40. Sevenster M, van Ommering R, Qian Y. Automatically Correlating 
Clinical Findings and Body Locations in Radiology Reports Using 
MedLEE. J Digit Imaging; 25: 240–249. 
41. Le QV, Mikolov T. Distributed Representations of Sentences and 
Documents. Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on 
Machine Learning, Beijing, China, 2014; 32. 
42. Danso S, Atwell E, Johnson O. A Comparative Study of Machine 
Learning Methods for Verbal Autopsy Text Classification. 
arXiv.org; 1402: arXiv:1402.4380. 
43. Fujita K, Akiyama M, Park K, et al. Linguistic analysis of large-
scale medical incident reports for patient safety. Stud Health 
Technol Inform; 180: 250–254. 
44. Wang Y, Coiera E, Runciman W, et al. Using multiclass 
classification to automate the identification of patient safety 
incident reports by type and severity. BMC Med Inform Decis Mak; 
17: 84. 
45. Alghoson AM. Medical Document Classification Based on MeSH. 
IEEE, 2013, pp. 2571–2575. 
46. Stanfill MH, Williams M, Fenton SH, et al. A systematic literature 
review of automated clinical coding and classification systems. J 
Am Med Inform Assoc; 17: 646–651. 
47. Warrer P, Hansen EH, Juhl-Jensen L, et al. Using text-mining 
techniques in electronic patient records to identify ADRs from 
medicine use. British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology; 73: 674–
684. 
Submission to Health Informatics Journal 
36 
 
48. Melton GB, Hripcsak G. Automated Detection of Adverse Events 
Using Natural Language Processing of Discharge Summaries. J 
Am Med Inform Assoc; 12: 448–457. 
49. Oster CV Jr, Strong JS, Zorn CK. Analyzing aviation safety: 
Problems, challenges, opportunities. Research in Transportation 
Economics; 43: 148–164. 
 
  
Submission to Health Informatics Journal 
37 
 
Appendix 1 – High level incident categories (from PISA Study)             
 For further details see Carson-Stevens et al. 2016 16 
0.0 Incorrect use of system 
0.1 Defensive reporting 
0.2 Irrelevant 
0.3 Insufficient detail 
0.4 Reporting deaths not related to healthcare 
0.5 Reporting an incident or patient injury not related to healthcare 
0.6 Pressure ulcer 
0.7 Healthcare Associated Infection 
0.8 Complaint or Coroner investigation 
0.9 Appropriate breach of confidentiality 
1. Administration 
2. Documentation 
3.Referrals  
4. Diagnosis and Assessment 
5. Treatment and Procedures (excluding drugs and vaccines) 
6. Medications and Vaccines 
6.1 Clinical Treatment Decision -  Errors in the treatment decision-making process 
6.2 Wrong medication Wrong medication prescribed 
6.3 Dispensing medication orders Error in the process of delivering a medication 
order or inappropriate medication order by a provider working under physician 
supervision 
6.4 Administering medications Error in the process of administering medication to a 
patient 
6.5 Monitoring Medication - Error in the process of monitoring dose-dependent 
medications, or those with side effects 
6.6 Adverse Event - Patient suffered a complication as a result of medication 
6.7 Drug Omission - Medication erroneously not given to or not taken by patient 
6.8 Patient self-administered overdose - Unintentional drug overdose by patient 
(self-administered) 
6.9 Incorrect storage Medication incorrectly stored 
6.10 Medication Timeliness Medication not commenced in a timely fashion 
6.11 Vaccines 
6.12 Medication unavailable 
6.13 Prescription handling.  Errors arising from e.g. lost or accidentally shredded 
prescriptions. 
6.14 lost medication 
6.15 Inappropriate medication supply - e.g illegal supply of medication 
6.16 Unsuitable medication taken by patient Medication erroneously taken by 
patient e.g. medication taken when stopped by GP or when not recommended 
6.17 OTC supply 
7. Investigations 
8. Communication 
9. Equipment 
10. Other  
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Appendix 2 – list of columns of data used 
 
1. Care setting of occurrence (categorical) 
2. Location – level 1 (categorical) 
3. Location – level 2 (categorical) 
4. Location – level 3 (categorical) 
5. Incident category – level 1 (categorical) 
6. Incident category – level 2 (categorical) 
7. Incident category – free text (converted to categorical – see method) 
8. Description of what happened (free text) 
9. Actions preventing recurrence (free text) 
10. Apparent causes (free text) 
11. Specialty – level 1 (categorical) 
12. Specialty – level 2 (categorical) 
13. Degree of harm/severity (categorical) 
14. Medical process (categorical) 
15. Medical error category (categorical) 
16. Approved name of drug 1 (categorical) 
17. Proprietary name of drug 1 (categorical) 
18. Approved name of drug 2 (categorical) 
19. Proprietary name of drug 2  (categorical) 
20. Patient age at time of incident (categorical) 
